In contemporary social choice theory, pioneered by Kenneth Arrow, this democratic value is absolutely central, and the discipline has continued to be loyal to this basic informational presumption. For example, when an axiomatic structure yields the existence of a dictator as a joint implication of chosen axioms that seemed plausible enough (on this more presently), this is immediately understood as something of a major embarrassment for that set of axioms, rather than being taken to be just fine on the ground that it is a logical corollary of axioms that have been already accepted and endorsed. We cannot begin to understand the intellectual challenge involved in Arrow's impossibility theorem without coming to grips with the focus on informational inclusiveness that goes with a democratic commitment, which is deeply offended by a dictatorial procedure. This is so, even when the dictatorial result is entailed by axiomatic requirements that seem reasonable, taking each axiom on its own. So let me begin by discussing what Arrow's impossibility theorem asserts, and how it is established. The theorem has the reputation of being "formidable," which is a good description of its deeply surprising nature as well as of its vast reach, but the air of distanced respect is not particularly helpful in encouraging people to try to understand how the result emerges. It is, however, important for people interested in political science, in welfare economics, or in public policy to understand the analytical foundations of Arrow's far-reaching result, and there is no reason why it should be seen as a very difficult result to comprehend and appreciate. A closer understanding is also relevant for seeing what its implications are, and what alleged implications, often attributed to it, may be misleading.
The proof of the Arrow theorem I shall present follows Arrow's own line of reasoning, but through some emendations that make it agreeably short and rather easy to follow. However, it is a completely elementary proof, using nothing other than basic logic, like Arrow's own. 5 The 5 Providing short proofs of Arrow's theorem is something of a recurrent exercise in social choice theory, and one must not make a cult of it, since all the proofs draw in one way or another on Arrow's trail-blazing insight. One has to be, however, careful not to be too convinced by the alleged "shortness" of some proofs when they draw on other mathematical results (as some of important issue here is not just the shortness of getting to the Arrow theorem, but the ease with which it can be followed by anyone without any technical reasoning or any particular knowledge of mathematics or advanced mathematical logic. So I have spelled out fully the reasoning behind each step (perhaps too elaborately for some who are very familiar with this type of logical reasoning).
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The basic engagement of social choice with which Arrow was concerned involved evaluating and choosing from the set of available social states (x,y, ...), with each x, y, etc, describing what is happening to the individuals and the society in the respective states of affairs.
Arrow was concerned with arriving at an aggregate "social ranking" R defined over the set of potentially available social states x, y, etc. With his democratic commitment, the basis of the social ranking R is taken to be the collection of individual rankings {R i }, with any R i standing for person i's preference ranking over the alternative social states open for social choice. It is this functional relation that Kenneth Arrow calls the "social welfare function." Given any set of individual preferences, the social welfare function determines a particular aggregate social ranking R.
That there could be problems of consistency in voting rules was demonstrated by the Marquis de Condorcet in the 18th century. It is useful to recollect how the problem comes about, for example for the method of majority of decision. the proofs do), which are invoked and used but not established in the course of the proof. Arrow's proof was entirely elementary, and did not presume anything other than the basic rules of logic, which is the route followed here. I presented an earlier version of this proof in footnotes 9 and 10, in "Rationality and Social Choice" (1995); reprinted in Rationality and Freedom (2002) , page 267. In majority decisions, x defeats y, which defeats z, which in turn defeats x. The R generated by majority rule violates transitivity and even weaker conditions of consistency than that (such as acyclicity). And since each alternative is defeated by another available alternative in the available set, there is no majority winner -no "choice set" -for the available set {x,y,z}.
Majority rule is of course a very special rule, though highly appealing. Arrow's theorem, among other things, generalizes the problem for any voting rule -indeed it does much more than that (as I shall presently discuss).
Consider now the following set of axioms, which are motivated by Arrow's original axioms, but are in fact somewhat simpler -and also somewhat less demanding -which, taken together, are nevertheless adequate for the impossibility theorem.
U (unrestricted domain): For any logically possible set of individual preferences, there is a social ordering R. 6 An ordering is a ranking that is reflexive, transitive and complete.
. Let everyone in G 1 prefer x to y, and x to z, with the ranking of y and z unspecified, and let everyone in G 2 prefer x to y, and z to y. Others not in G can have any set of preferences. By the decisiveness of G, we have x socially preferred to y. If, now, z is taken to be socially at least as good as x for some configuration of individual preferences over {z,x}, then we must have z socially preferred to y (since x is socially preferred to y) for that configuration of preferences over {z,x}. Since no one's preference over {z,y} other than those in I end with a few observations on the nature of Arrow's result. First, the combination of unrestricted domain, independence and the Pareto principle -each of which are individually somewhat innocuous -seem to produce both the spread of decisiveness and the contractability of decisive sets. One lesson to draw is that it is hard to judge the plausibility of axioms unless we also consider with what other axioms they are to be harnessed together. Consider a nasty proposal to take some of the income of the poorest person and to divide it over several others. In a society of selfish persons, this will be a majority improvement. So the problem here is not the lack of consistency of majority rule, or any other voting rule. It is that we are in wrong territory by concentrating only individual preference orderings, and then -with the help of combining U, I and P -getting to the Spread of Decisiveness. It is the wrong informational base for many welfare economic concerns, and it is perhaps all to the good that the majority rule is also -in addition to being obtuse -inconsistent.
Fifth, the way to tackle the Arrow theorem in the context of welfare economics certainly includes making use of interpersonal comparisons in our judgments. Indeed, all public policy tends to bring in interpersonal comparisons in one way or another. But that route is not easily available when we are dealing with a voting process, such as elections of candidates for, say, political positions. For the political exercise and voting theory, we have to think in different lines, as indeed Eric Maskin does, with his usual skill and elegance, in his own lecture here. 10 Finally, even for political processes, one problem remains that does not involve interpersonal comparisons, but for which the Arrovian axioms are inadequate. And that is the problem of liberty and rights. If we follow John Stuart Mill in standing up for the rights of minorities and of individuals in their personal domain, then we must not be too impressed by how many people oppose the minorities' being able to choose their own life styles, or how many try to eliminate the exercise personal liberties by individuals. The importance of liberty may
